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Abstract
The co-production of  forensic–scientific knowledge claims, across disciplinary boundaries, requires the
mobilisation of  separate (and competing) domains of  expertise. The task of  the interdisciplinary socio-legal
researcher – exploring the collaborative practices which contribute to the construction of  DNA profiling
evidence – is, therefore, a complex one. It requires an understanding of  the ways in which the heterogeneous
groups of  institutional actors, who populate the criminal justice system, set about capturing biological
substrates. Further, it requires the researcher to follow a complex series of  laboratory translations:
technological metamorphoses, which serve to convert evidential material into graphical representations,
textual inscriptions, and probabilistic outputs. This paper explores the ways in which these dynamic processes
may be more comprehensively understood through the use of  visual research methods. Further, it
demonstrates the capacity for socio-legal modelling to contribute to interdisciplinary forensic research.
Keywords: forensic science; visual research methods; DNA profiling; rhetoric of  science;
probabilistic evidence.
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DNA swab collection kit
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The DNA swab collection kit consists of  a sealable transparent evidence bag and a sterile‘swab stick’. The collection stick comprises a sterile paper wand, with a serrated edge,
which is designed to be inserted into the suspect’s mouth and rubbed against the inner
cheek. Alternatively, the stick may be used to swab a range of  body fluids, from blood and
semen to saliva. These actions deposit DNA-bearing skin cells, or fluids, onto the collection
stick, which is then inserted into the sterile plastic container and deposited in the ‘tamper
evident’ transparent bag. The collection kit is intended as an efficient tool, which can be
easily used by institutional actors both within, and allied to, the criminal justice system, in
order that they may successfully capture the bio-identities of  suspect individuals. It is also
intended to sample and document physical evidence for later use in court.
The DNA collection kit can be important in initiating a forensic investigation and may
prove vital in securing a conviction. However, between collection and evaluation lie a
complex series of  laboratory translations, which serve to convert the evidential material
into: a stable biological substrate; a graphical representation; a probabilistic output; and a
textual inscription. As a socio-legal researcher exploring the construction of  DNA-
profiling evidence, one of  my primary tasks is to reveal this hidden set of  translations.
And my research is predicated on the understanding that each phase of  this evidential
pathway (from the collection and stabilisation of  trace samples to their conversion into
graphical representations and statistical probabilities) is shaped by objects, processes and
contextual factors -– both socially constructed and contingent – which transcend the
boundaries of  law and science. Interdisciplinary legal research of  this kind throws up
many challenges: it requires a prolonged engagement with a diverse body of  scholarship;
the negotiation of  new vocabularies; and immersion in disparate epistemologies. It is only
through such efforts that researchers can gain valuable insights into the collaborative
practices of  the heterogeneous groups of  institutional actors who populate the criminal
justice system. However, it also requires the researcher to remain open to new
methodologies and research practices: methods which can produce valuable insights and
serendipitous connections. The socio-legal modelling exercise is one such method.
Through the process of  socio-legal modelling I was able to open up a conceptual
space in which I could perceive law’s instrumental use of  mathematics as an applied form
of  aesthetics, and its deployment of  Bayesian probabilities as a form of  technological
rhetoric. The process, and its benefits, will be discussed in detail below. However, it is
worth stating that by working through the socio-legal modelling process I was ultimately
able to achieve a more rigorous, and thought-provoking, analysis of  the transformational
grammar of  forensic DNA profiling than had previously been possible.
The co-production of forensic–scientific knowledge claims
My current research focuses on a paradigmatic example of  interdisciplinary forensic
collaboration: the co-production of  forensic–scientific knowledge claims derived from
DNA profiling. DNA-profiling techniques play a central role in a growing number of
criminal investigations (and subsequent proceedings). These require the mobilisation of
specialist expert knowledge drawn from disparate fields – law, forensic science and
research science – whose representatives collaborate with associated institutional actors
within the criminal justice system, in order to produce a compelling form of  probabilistic
evidence which appears to conform to progressive representations of  scientific and
technological advance. However, it is important to note that:
. . . standard framings [of  scientific practice] converge in their assumption that
science and, to a lesser extent, technology possess an inner logic, an autonomous
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framework of  validation and control, that operates irrespective of  the law and
does not need to be subjected to the law’s normative concerns or institutional
practices.1
DNA-profiling evidence does not simply present itself, as a statistical inscription, at the
administrative border of  the courtroom. The final conversion to a ‘likelihood ratio’ is
actually the ultimate step in a complex series of  transformations (from material sample,
to stabilised laboratory substrate, graphical representation and probabilistic
interpretation). Thus, it is possible to argue that, within an adversarial system governed
by technologically ambivalent procedures, ‘cross-examination and the legal rules of
evidence operate only as recipes for obfuscation’, restricted to questions of  interpretation
and blind to the substantive scientific content of  the preceding investigation and
evaluation.
On the contrary, a rigorously sociological approach – one informed by legal realism –
requires that we follow the evidential trajectory of  DNA profiling, from the very
beginning of  its journey – as a raw material sample – to its disposal in the courtroom.
Through adopting a socially constructivist perspective, we may attempt to isolate, and
better understand, the complex of  interposing influences and processes that shape the
production of  biological evidence. Each phase of  that evidential trajectory (from the
collection and stabilisation of  trace samples to their conversion into graphical
representations and statistical probabilities) revolves around material objects and visual
representations. Therefore, by necessity, research in this area must progress through a
consideration of  the central role of  artefacts, and visual representations, in mediating
forensic–scientific communication.
Any study of  forensic knowledge production must also provide an account of
forensic expertise. Why does the law look to science in order to provide expert evidence
with which to guide and assist the court in order to aid the trier-of-fact in their
deliberations? Clearly, the law considers that knowledge derived from expert
interdisciplinary collaboration is of  a higher quality than that which could be derived from
lay, intradisciplinary analysis. That belief  is consistent with a general assertion of  quality
(some say assumption), which is frequently made with regard to interdisciplinary
knowledge claims.2 It is often claimed that interdisciplinarity leads to better quality
outputs and to greater impact. This is only partially true. If  interdisciplinarity is done
correctly it can lead to significant gains. If  it is done badly it can lead to the ‘enslavement
of  one domain of  knowledge production to another’3 and the instrumental use of
interdisciplinary knowledge claims, which are largely devoid of  context. What I hope to
demonstrate, through my empirical research, is a way in which we can more readily
differentiate between productive practices and unproductive, instrumental practices and,
thereby, produce higher quality outputs, with more consistency, whilst avoiding the
pitfalls. Socio-legal enquiry across disciplinary boundaries also offers a reflexive
opportunity to recognise, and account for, the normative philosophical perspectives
which underpin these practices. Predictably, my work derives its theoretical underpinnings
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1     S Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science and Technology in America (Harvard University Press) 1995.
2     See J T Klein, Crossing Boundaries: Knowledge, Disciplinarities and Interdisciplinarities (University of  Virginia Press
1996). 
3     M King, ‘The Truth about Autopoiesis’ (1993) 20(2) Journal of  Law and Society 218–36. 
from both science and technology studies, and Teubner’s theory of  legal autopoiesis.4 As
Dwyer states:
The idea that society can be made up of  a number of  systems of  discourse,
which may recognise one another’s existence, but which cannot fully engage in
one another’s discourse, provides an attractive background against which to
explore the relationship between social systems, and in particular between law
and other systems, such as medicine, science and economics.5
Needless to say, forensic–scientific knowledge production does not occur solely within
the rarefied atmosphere of  the laboratory. The evidential trajectory carries material
samples across contested terrain, where it is exposed to economic cross-winds and
subjected to the constant interposition of  policy and governance factors. The problem,
therefore, is not to attempt to show whether, and to what extent, forensic expertise (as
enacted through the analysis and interpretation of  visual DNA profiles and the series of
translations required to turn raw material samples into Bayesian statistical outputs) is
shaped by differing policy, cultural and socio-economic factors but, rather, to determine
the extent to which such factors shape the contexts within which the expert is called upon
to make, and to justify his or her decisions. And, in attempting to address these issues, my
research draws on both social constructionism and Foucaultian theories of
governmentality.6
Moving from theory to practice, it became clear from an early stage that the
completion of  a thorough socio-legal account of  the construction of  DNA-profiling
evidence would require a significant level of  comparative empirical research, not least due
to the ways in which scientific realist accounts of  forensic–scientific practice may serve
to obfuscate the contingent and situated nature of  evidence construction. The initial
phase of  the investigation comprised a series of  visits to forensic science providers
(FSPs) in order to observe participants and to conduct interviews. For instance, the
subject of  the primary case study was Forensic Science Northern Ireland (FSNI), a public
sector forensic science provider that operates as an agency within the Northern Ireland
Department of  Justice. FSNI acts as a primary service provider to the Police Service of
Northern Ireland (amongst others). This FSP offers a diverse array of  forensic services
‘under one roof ’, including DNA profiling and forensic casework.
Field data capture began in early 2014 and involved a series of  visits to the agency’s
premises in Carrickfergus, Northern Ireland. There, I was able to observe research
participants, and to conduct a series of  semi-structured interviews with a heterogeneous
cohort of  staff  members. These actors – who represented a diverse array of  functions
and specialisms – include the chief  executive, directors of  laboratory and reporting
services, lead scientists responsible for biological examination and reporting, and the
custodian of  the Northern Ireland DNA Database. In addition, I was able to engage with
– and to interview – staff  members responsible for auxiliary and administrative functions,
including quality assurance and business enhancement.
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4     See N Luhmann, ‘Operational Closure and Structural Coupling’ (1992) 13(5) Cardozo Law Review 1434; and
L P Luisi, ‘Autopoiesis: A Review and a Reappraisal’ (2003) 90 Naturwissenschaften 49–59. Also, G Teubner
(ed), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society (Walter de Gruyter 1988) and Law as an Autopoietic
System (Basil Blackwell1993); M King and F Kaganas, ‘The Risks and Dangers of  Experts in Court’ (1998)1
Current Legal Issues 221–42; M King, ‘An Autopoietic Approach to the Problems Presented by Parental
Alienation Syndrome’ (2002) 13 Journal of  Forensic Psychiatry 609–35; King (n 3); and M King, ‘The
Construction and Demolition of  the Luhmann Heresy’ (2001) 12(1) Law and Critique 1–32.
5     D Dwyer, The Judicial Assessment of  Expert Evidence (Cambridge University Press 2008) 124.
6     G Burchell, C Gordon and P Miller, The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (University of  Chicago Press
1991).
Fieldwork was extended to encompass a heterogeneous group of  associated
institutional actors whose interactions help to shape the co-production of  forensic
evidence. These included members of  the judiciary and the legal profession, alongside
staff  at the Northern Ireland Public Prosecution Service, whose ‘Speeding Up Justice’
Department provided raw quantitative data, relating to the Indictable Cases Pilot Scheme,
specifically for analysis and inclusion in the primary case study.
Data derived from these studies was largely textual and descriptive, consisting of
notes and transcribed interviews. Despite attempting to expand the scope of  my
exploration of  DNA-profiling evidence to include its processing within the laboratory, I
was aware of  an important missing element: the ultimate effect of  the forensic product
on the trier-of-fact. Therefore, I welcomed the opportunity to participate in creative
methodological practices, which might facilitate the generation of  serendipitous insights
into the probabilistic representation of  forensic evidence: practices and approaches which
would allow participants to draw reflexive, sensitive and meaningful insights, which are
both subjective and aleatory and which help to expose different aspects of  the field data,
allowing the researcher to place it in a meaningful socio-legal context. This need was met
through the process of  socio-legal model-making and through my participation in the
Pop-Up Museum of  Socio-Legal Objects.
The DNA collection kit as a socio-legal object
It should be clear from the above discussion that material objects play an important role
in the study of  the co-production of  forensic–scientific knowledge claims. In the case of
the DNA collection kit, the focus on sterility, a recordable chain of  evidence, and
evidence of  unauthorised contact accords with a scientific–realist perspective and implies
that any loss of  evidential value can only stem from a derogation from administrative
protocols. Crucially, this perspective fails to account for the socially constructed nature of
DNA profiling (and associated forensic techniques).
With its focus on sterility and regulatory objectivity, the swab stick may be viewed as
a procedural prompt: the means through which institutional actors enact, and reaffirm,
their belief  in ‘the forensic imaginary’. The ‘forensic imaginary’ is outlined by Williams,7
and rests upon a commitment to two principles. The first of  these is the assertion that all
objects are unique, and that it is possible to capture the unique identifiability of  any object
(whether or not tied to an ineradicable bodily substrate). The second principle is
encapsulated in the proposition – widely attributed to the French scientist Edmond
Locard – that ‘exchange always happens’.
. . . whenever individuals make physical contact with other individuals, or enter
and leave defined physical spaces, a (usually unintentional) transfer of  varying
amounts of  matter – inert and vital material takes place between the parties and
places involved.8
The phenomenon attains a special resonance in the current context, given that FSNI’s
new ‘high care’ laboratory facility will ‘be known as the Locard Building, in reference to
the “founding father” of  forensic science’.9
Recourse to the ‘forensic imaginary’ may serve a particular purpose within the
criminal justice system. As Williams states:
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7     R Williams, ‘DNA Databases and the Forensic Imaginary’ in R Hindmarsh and B Prainsack (eds), Genetic
Suspects: Global Governance of  Forensic DNA Profiling and Databasing (Oxford University Press 2010)
8     Ibid 134.
9     Edmond Locard is credited as the progenitor of  modern forensic scientific practices, having coined the
phrase, ‘Every contact leaves a trace’. See analytical discussion, above.
. . . the imaginary has been carried in ‘images, stories and legends’ (Taylor 2004:
23) . . . and it has contributed hugely to the willingness of  governments to fund
forensic science developments and ambitions.10
Those whose task it is to craft criminal justice policy, and to alleviate public concerns,
often seek recourse to ‘the demonstrably effective use of  current and emergent
technologies’:11 techniques which are deemed capable of  capturing, knowing and
recording, individuality and of  anchoring members of  suspect populations to an
inscription derived from a stable and ineradicable biological substrate. However, these
principles – upon which the ‘forensic imaginary’ is founded – are demonstrably
ambiguous and vulnerable to criticism and revision.
Thus, from a research perspective, the DNA collection kit may represent a somewhat
ambiguous object. While it serves to capture the identity of  suspect populations, its
representations are limited to one part of  the evidential trajectory and fail to capture the
sequence of  translations, which convert raw biological material into statistical
probabilities. It is static as opposed to dynamic and serves as a discrete focus for
reflection rather than a point of  departure on an interdisciplinary process. A brief
discussion of  the ‘transfer and persistence’ problem may serve to illustrate the inherent
limitations and ambiguities of  the DNA swab collection stick.
‘Transfer and persistence’ issues represent a growing problem for DNA-profiling
experts, whose technologies are now so sensitive that they routinely report ‘mixed’
samples, including deposits made indirectly through intermediate contacts and low-
template DNA, shed naturally by individuals, and subsequently spread through contact
and dispersal. In many cases, scientists can de-convolute mixed samples using their
expertise (often with the aid of  complex computer algorithms). The de-convoluted results
may reveal a major contributor and one – or more – minor contributors, all of  whose
profiles may be complete or partial.
However, the evaluative problems are not limited to attribution. While individual
profiles may be ‘matched’ to individuals on the DNA database – with probabilities in the
order of  one in one billion – the resulting evidence may be effectively neutralised by the
issue of  the transfer and persistence of  DNA deposits across multiple surfaces. The
interposition of  such issues shifts the focus of  analysis, such that the courts should no
longer address themselves to the question of  ‘To whom does this DNA sample belong?’
The salient question becomes, ‘How did this DNA sample come to get here?’ Thus, while
the collection kit may serve a useful purpose within a fairly rudimentary context, the
resulting probabilistic evidence (in the order of  one billion to one) may be simultaneously
compelling and meaningless. The challenge therefore, was to experiment with socio-legal
modelling in order to reveal the dual nature of  probabilistic evidence.
Socio-legal modelling
I had previously embarked upon a consideration of  the ways in which probabilistic
evidence is presented to jurors, alongside a consideration of  the ways in which expert
communication might be improved through visual translation. I was aware that the terms
‘translation’ and ‘ratio’ are common to both forensic biology and engineering. In
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10   Williams (n 7) 135.
11   In his 2014 Kalisher Lecture to the Criminal Bar Association, the Lord Chief  Justice, the Rt Hon The Lord
Thomas of  Cwmgiedd, expressed concerns regarding the potential of  new, or complex, scientific
developments to tarnish the status of  forensic DNA profiling. Lord Thomas identified the ‘challenge for all
. . . advocates and judges: to manage the presentation and testing of  forensic evidence in such a way as to avoid
fatally undermining confidence’.
engineering, the terms are deployed in reference to gear wheels, through which power is
translated (in accordance with a particular ratio) in an effort to convert a rotational input
to one of  greater or lesser magnitude.
The challenge was to capture the persistent fallacy of  scientific realism, as iterated
through forensic–scientific knowledge production: that a measurable input leads to a
measurable output – an output which is both predictable and consistent. Therefore, I
decided to mount a series of  four interconnected brass clock wheels onto a wooden
plinth. The series of  wheels were mounted on a piece of  grey lacquered wood.
Introducing a bio-mechanical input to the initial wheel would turn all successive gear
wheels. Further, the wooden plinth was surrounded by a black border to represent the
‘black-boxing’ of  the intermediating series of  translations.
The results were as surprising to me as they were to my audience. In order to express
a standard likelihood ratio, in the order of  one billion to one (an order of  magnitude
commonly encountered when dealing with DNA attributions on the source and sub-
source level), an output gear wheel of  38 millimetres diameter (as used in my socio-legal
model) would need to achieve one billion rotations for every single complete turn of  the
input wheel. What size, then, would the input wheel have to be? According to my
calculations, the wheel would have to be 12,095km in diameter.12 Clearly, such an exercise
would be unfeasible. However, the ability to render such ratios in visual terms – however
astronomical – led to valuable insights into the use of  statistics and their place in the
courtroom. It raised questions regarding the relative importance of  consistent and
predictable inputs and outputs versus clarity and utility. These considerations will form
the conclusion of  this article. However, it is first worth reviewing the practice of  socio-
legal model-making.
Socio-legal modelling as reflexive praxis
Throughout each stage of  the socio-legal model-making process I was encouraged to
reflect mindfully on the impact of  this unique methodology on my work as a legal
researcher. A complete – but brief  – consideration of  each stage is provided below.
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1 CHOOSING AN OBJECT
During this preliminary stage I was forced to approach my research from new perspectives.
The process invited me to reconsider the objects of  legal enquiry and law’s relationship with
other disciplines. This process of  reconsideration and exploration has been useful in
establishing a more nuanced understanding of  the research topic and themes.
2 MAKING A MODEL OF THE OBJECT
This was a particularly enlightening activity, which enabled me to focus on the necessity
of  entering into a ‘hands-on’ physical relationship with the model-making materials and
of  confronting the limitations of  the original object (in particular its inability to represent
a dynamic process). I was guided in this activity by my knowledge of  the research process
but also – to a degree – open to intuition as I worked with the materials.
3 WRITING YOUR OBJECT-BASED COMMENTARY
Writing began with note-taking. The process of  writing about my thoughts and ideas, my
concerns and experiences, enabled me to re-interpret my research project in a
comprehensive and systematic way: one that took account of  my life history and
subjective experiences. It also benefited me to engage in a self-directed activity that
enhanced the process of  reflexively reviewing the development of  my research.
In the course of  my object-based reflective writing I had to ask myself  philosophical
questions about my orientation to the world, exploring my fundamental assumptions and
interrogating the values and beliefs that underpin them. In this way I was able to better
understand – and account for – ‘researcher positionality’. I believe that this subjective
interrogation of  my own position enabled me to better understand the needs of  jury
members and legal triers-of-fact when confronted with unfamiliar scientific evidence. In
particular, it raised questions regarding the appropriateness of  strong match probabilities
(of  one billion to one) within a forum which – in civil procedural terms – requires the
trier-of-fact to arrive at a judgment on the mere balance of  probabilities. The process
raised concerns about the dehumanising power of  statistical information and the
potential for strong match probabilities to provide seemingly conclusive answers which
may prevent jury members from entering into a more detailed consideration and
evaluation of  the entirety of  the evidence.
4 DISPLAYING YOUR MODEL, TOGETHER WITH EVERYONE ELSE’S, 
DURING THE THEME SESSIONS
This enabled me to see how my model sat alongside others and I was able to reflect on
our shared challenges and common goals. It also enabled comparisons to be made
between different approaches using a range of  materials drawn from alternative practices.
I was able to reflect on the degree to which the mode of  practice, and the materials used,
embodied the topic of  discussion. My own model attempted to reflect a dynamic
mathematical and scientific practice. Thus, it used moving gear wheels mounted on a
piece of  wood. As such, its engineering reflected the use of  scientific models to measure
elements of  a theory or design process. Other participants chose more artistic forms of
expression. Some were intricately patterned, others amorphous. Some chose to use
evocative documents and graphical representations. The range of  approaches made me
consider alternative methods of  model-making. Next steps will be to attempt a series of
different approaches using a range of  materials in order to look for points of
convergence and to enable me to benefit from a range of  perspectives.
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5 REFERRING TO THE PHYSICAL MODEL AND/OR THE IMAGE OF
YOUR ORIGINAL OBJECT IN YOUR PRESENTATION
The presentation enabled me to better gauge those aspects of  the design process which
resonated with a legal audience and those more abstruse elements of  my presentation
which achieved less impact. The heart of  my presentation involved a discussion of  the
scale of  probabilities routinely used in the courtroom. Statistical evaluations in the order
of  one billion to one are routinely encountered, based upon the estimated frequency of
a particular DNA profile within a known population. However, these have been shown
to contribute little to the court’s understanding of  the evidential significance of  a
reported DNA ‘match’ and could even prove prejudicial. Therefore, these are often
replaced by statistical evaluations based on Bayesian theories. The Bayesian approach to
inferential reasoning is organised around the production of  ‘likelihood ratios’ from pairs
of  propositions. The forensic scientist constructs these propositions, which correspond
to likely scenarios and typical explanations. The Bayesian approach requires the scientist
to ask a particular set of  questions regarding the object of  analysis. As such, Bayesian
reasoning has be likened to an ‘inference engine’, capable of  being updated in order to
assimilate new contextual information. However, this dependency on background
information creates a relationship of  forensic reliance on the police or prosecutor, in
order that the latter may provide the necessary context. This process of  construction,
communication and representation is known as case assessment and interpretation (CAI),
an approach pioneered by the UK Forensic Science Service and now used by commercial
and state-run laboratories across the globe. Nonetheless, the use of  CAI remains limited
to serious cases, with non-contextual match probabilities still routinely used in relation to
so-called ‘volume crimes’.
The ability to visualise the match probability ratios, using a model and visual aids, was
particularly helpful and feedback was encouraging. It enabled participants to explore the
meaning and effect of  strong match probabilities. I intend to extend this exploration,
perhaps attempting to develop a visual aid that enables jury members (and other triers-
of-fact) to better visualise probabilistic evidence in the courtroom.
6 SEEING/HEARING OTHER PRESENTERS USING THEIR OBJECT/MODEL
TO MAKE A LEGAL POINT
It was fascinating to hear Brechtian performativity discussed alongside Artaud’s theatre
of  cruelty. Once again, the styles of  presentation varied and enabled reflective
consideration of  the different approaches but also of  the common emergent themes.
7 SEEING THE POP-UP MUSEUM PROJECTED OVER LUNCH/TEA AT SLSA 2017
I engaged with other members of  the Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA) and viewed
the Pop-Up Museum. I discussed the visualisation process with other postgraduate research
students from my institution, actively listening to their stories and experiences, discussing the
relative strengths and weaknesses of  different methodological approaches, and comparing
outcomes. I found it worthwhile to listen to their experiences with visual methods – their
successes, frustrations and initial failures – as these were not dissimilar to my own.
8 SEEING THE MODELS DISPLAYED TOGETHER AT AFTERNOON TEA
The opportunity to view the models together led to a fruitful discussion with other
delegates. We considered the ways in which incorporating images of  models into our
research data might aid understanding and enable the creation of  previously unarticulated
constructions of  the research process.
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9 SEEING YOUR OBJECT AS PART OF THE ONLINE POP-UP MUSEUM COLLECTION
Seeing my object online enabled a more objective consideration of  the need for all
researchers to be reflexive about power dynamics and to be mindful of  their role in co-
constructing the research environment.
10 SEEING YOUR OBJECT AS PART OF THE FOLDED PAPER GUIDE TO THE COLLECTION
This was a particularly interesting element of  the process, which enabled me to consider
the ways in which certain objects are selected, curated, documented and presented. Being
asked to fold the programmes helped, as it felt as though we were also constructing the
fixed documentary presentation of  our objects. It provoked some consideration of  the
ways in which objects are selected, indexed, catalogued and presented. This provided a
degree of  isomorphism between the design process and the substance of  my doctoral
study (the selection, cataloguing and presentation of  evidential samples).
11 SEEING THE POP-UP MUSEUM ON TWITTER
This led to an intense reflection on certain aspects of  the process. It demonstrated that
researchers may, when necessary, adopt a more flexible approach: one which is capable of
providing insights which may otherwise have remained obfuscated. It clarified nascent
thoughts regarding the rhetorical aspects of  scientific argumentation and the instrumental
uses of  probabilistic arguments within the courtroom.
12 SEEING THE POP-UP MUSEUM SET OUT AS AN EXPERIMENT ON THE
ECONOSOCIOLEGAL.WORDPRESS.COM BLOG POST
I was able to place this project in the context of  (econo-socio-legal) visual methods in
general: to evaluate their use, consider the degree to which such methods may reduce
power imbalances in the field, gauge their potential to meaningfully engage others in the
research process, and help to overcome barriers (both cognitive and epistemological).
13 CONCLUSIONS
The socio-legal modelling process opened up a conceptual space which allowed me to
explore themes that I had hitherto been unable to develop due to their seeming
intangibility. Thus, it provided tangible clarity and coherence. The process allowed me the
opportunity to explore the meaning of  probabilistic evidence, to overcome the confines
of  arid mathematical theorising and to expose the rhetorical roots of  forensic–scientific
argumentation. 
Incorporation of socio-legal modelling outcomes: scientific rhetoric 
and ‘the mathematical sublime’
It was only during the final stage of  the modelling process – the incorporation of  insights
derived from the process into the research project – that its methodological potential, and
practical utility, was fully realised.
The modelling process had enabled me to surmount the realist account of  DNA – as
a universal, ineradicable substrate, which encodes bio-individuality – and to perceive the
limits of  translation and the problems associated with the Bayesian probabilities. It
invited me to ask fundamental questions about the place of  astronomical statistical ratios
in a legal arena which is more accustomed to probabilistic calculations taking place on the
level of  reasonable doubt, or the mere balance of  probabilities. I was drawn to make
comparisons on the aesthetic level, particularly with Piranesi’s engravings of  carceri
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(prisons), in which tiny stricken figures populate dungeons of  vast dehumanising
proportions. Of  note, in light of  the above discussion, is Piranesi’s rendering of  ‘The
Giant Wheel’, with its echoes of  Foucauldian disciplinary power. And, just as Piranesi’s
carceri were ‘capricci’ – whimsical aggregates of  monumental architecture and ruin – so the
seemingly robust facade of  statistical evidence appeared equally empty of  purpose.
However, it is not the use of  probabilistic information in and of  itself  but, rather, the
magnitude of  the resulting ratio that had been rendered problematic. The use of  ratios in
the order of  billions, tending towards the infinite, now appeared more emblematic of  the
Kantian mathematical sublime than of  expertise and rational deliberation.
Kant’s13 taxonomy of  aesthetic sensibility divides the sublime into the mathematical
and the dynamical, the former being concerned with vast magnitude while the latter is
concerned with vast natural power. The latter achieves sublimity through its disunity and
formlessness, which acts against understanding and overwhelms the imagination. On the
contrary, the distinctive feature of  the mathematical sublime is its ‘absolute’ greatness, in
relation to an objective standard: infinity. This greatness is beyond comparison, hence
sublime. Sublime phenomena cannot be measured by an extrinsic standard and must
therefore be judged on their own terms. While natural objects, judged by their physical
dimensions, may be deemed great or small in reference to some other object of  a different
magnitude, the sublime cannot be judged by such subjective standards.14 Therefore, the
sublime, in its absolute greatness, must be a function of  reason, in terms of  its internal
logic, since it does not presuppose an external standard.
As Smith15 suggests, the mathematical sublime ‘is especially concerned with the
importance (or unimportance) of  infinity as a measure against which phenomenal
magnitudes are compared’. Apprehension of  the mathematical sublime rests upon an
aesthetic judgement, which is largely intuitive and decidedly non-cognitive, yet displays a
particular relation to cognition, which Kant describes as an embodied purposiveness. This
‘subjective formal purposiveness’ is – in the instant case – related to probabilistic
concepts but is satisfied by their mere presentation and the resulting intuition that such
presentation accords with reason. It therefore serves as a catalysing agency, which
furnishes the law with the strategic dimensions of  forensic–scientific reasoning. Indeed,
we may be entitled to look upon probabilistic forensic reasoning as a genre of  scientific
rhetoric. One which, when applied to DNA-profiling techniques, has proven
overwhelmingly successful in provoking an aesthetic response. These results support
James Boyd White’s assertion that ‘law is rhetoric, and rhetoric is law’.
Through reframing interdisciplinary forensic–scientific reasoning, as an exercise in
rhetorical persuasion, the instability and indeterminacy of  legal judgment becomes more
apparent. The efforts of  the courts and the judiciary to reconcile the knowledge claims
of  a variety of  institutional actors – each of  whom embody disparate epistemological
traditions and whose normative values are frequently divergent, if  not diametrically
opposed – is opened up to a critique which reveals the endemic contingency of
interdisciplinary co-production.
Probabilistic reasoning and the rhetorical reconstruction of DNA profiling
13   Immanuel Kant, Critique of  Judgment (J H Bernard (trans), Macmillan 1951).14
14   See, for example, R v Sean Hoey [2007] NICC 49, in which the court heard expert testimony that the molecules
used in Low Copy Number DNA were the size of  a millionth of  a grain of  salt.
15   S D Smith, ‘Kant’s Mathematical Sublime and the Role of  the Infinite: Reply to Crowther’ (2015) 20(1)
Kantian Review 99–120.
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